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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
APPELLANT, WEST VALLEY CITY, feels compelled to submit this 
Reply Brief in order to respond to new arguments raised by 
Appellee, Kent R. Fullmer ("Fullmer") . In his response, Fullmer 
argues that the trial judge's verdict was based on the facts of the 
case (see Brief of Appellee, West Valley City v. Fullmer at 4) . 
However, the verdict was based on the judge's incorrect 
interpretation of § 76-10-504 of the Utah Code, and was not based 
on the adequacy of the facts. 
In addition, Fullmer claims that the Utah Supreme Court's 
ruling in State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 (Utah 1981) is no longer 
relevant. Fullmer argues that since the language of § 76-10-504 
has changed since Williams was decided, the case is no longer 
precedent interpreting the statute. (Brief of Appellee at 4-5) 
However, the relevant language remains unchanged since 1981, and 
the Utah Legislature codified Williams into the present statute. 
Because of these facts, Williams remains a viable guide to 
interpret the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S VERDICT WAS AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION 
OF LAW, NOT A RULING ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The trial judge improperly dismissed the charge against 
Fullmer based on an incorrect interpretation of the applicable 
statute, not because the evidence had "credibility problems." The 
trial judge held that § 76-10-504 of the Utah Code requires that a 
concealed dangerous weapon must be moved in a vehicle in order to 
be "carried." (See Transcript of Verdict, West Valley City v. 
Fullmer at 2-3) This interpretation contradicts the plain meaning 
of the statute, and cases that have interpreted it. 
In his brief, Fullmer clouds the issue by arguing irrelevant 
facts. The verdict, however, is based on an interpretation of the 
law. The facts that led to the charge at issue are undisputed. 
The police officers arrived on the scene, answering a call from a 
security guard. Fullmer was inside the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle. The officers requested identification from Fullmer, which 
he provided. The officers ran a routine check for outstanding 
warrants, which revealed that there were warrants for Fullmer. He 
was taken into custody, and his car searched as part of the lawful 
arrest. The gun was found on the front seat, under an arm rest. 
That is the basis of the charge of carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon. These facts agree with Fullmer's Brief, (see Brief of 
Appellee at 2). 
The trial judge did not expressly rule on the evidence, only 
on his interpretation of the law. While the judge alluded to 
"credibility problems" in the testimony, he quickly turned to his 
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analysis of the applicable statute, and held that by definition the 
crime had not been committed, because Fullmer's car had not moved 
while it contained the gun. The judge never ruled on the facts of 
the case. The verdict contains no ruling on whether the elements of 
the offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because the 
trial judge's incorrect interpretation of the law precluded a 
verdict on the facts. 
The issue before the Court is whether the trial judge's 
interpretation of the law was incorrect, not a review of the 
evidence. As is discussed more fully in Appellant's Brief, the 
judge's interpretation of the law is not supported by the language 
of § 76-10-504 nor by the analysis given in State v. Williams, 636 
P.2d 1092 (Utah 1981). Since the interpretation of the law is 
incorrect, the case should be retried. 
II. THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE HAS NOT 
CHANGED SINCE WILLIAMS WAS DECIDED, AND THE 
WILLIAMS DECISION IS STILL RELEVANT BECAUSE IT HAS 
BEEN CODIFIED INTO THE STATUTE. 
Although the Utah Legislature modified the statute defining 
the offense of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon twice since 
1981, the relevant language has remained unchanged since State v. 
Williams was decided. Fullmer argues that since the language has 
changed, Williams is no longer relevant precedent interpreting the 
statute. (Brief of Appellee at 4-5) However, the legislature 
incorporated Williams into the statute, so the case is still 
relevant as interpretative. 
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A. The Relevant Language of § 76-10-504 has not Changed Since 
Williams was Decided. 
The statute in effect when Williams was decided retains the 
same relevant language today. In 1981, when the Utah Supreme Court 
decided Williams, § 76-10-504 read as follows: 
76-10-504. Carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.— 
Any person, except those persons described in section 76-
10-503, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon as defined 
in this part is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and if 
the dangerous weapon is a firearm, or sawed-off shotgun 
he shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-504 (1978) (emphasis added) . The statute did 
not define "carrying a concealed dangerous weapon," only what a 
dangerous weapon was. The Utah Supreme Court determined that under 
that statute, "carrying" means having a concealed weapon within a 
person's "immediate, easy or ready access . . ." State v. 
Williams, 636 P.2d at 1094. 
In 1982, the legislature added language to § 76-10-504, but 
kept the earlier definition: 
76-10-504. Carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in 
Section 76-10-503 and those persons exempted under 
Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, 
as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, except that a firearm that contains no 
ammunition and is enclosed in a case, gun box, or 
securely tied package shall not be considered a concealed 
weapon, but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and 
contains no ammunition, he shall be guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and 
contains ammunition, he shall be guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off 
shotgun, or if the dangerous weapon is a firearm 
and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall 
be guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
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(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, 
except persons described in Section 76-10-503, from 
keeping within his place of residence, place of business, 
or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that 
it shall be a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded 
firearm in a vehicle. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-504 (1995) (emphasis added) . The relevant 
language, indicated above, remained unchanged from the earlier 
statute. The changes concerned the degree of the offense, and a 
provision protecting the right of persons to keep firearms. Again, 
there was no definition of what constituted "carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon/' but the statute did provide that a firearm could 
legally be carried in a secure package or case. This reflects the 
holding from Williams, by requiring that a firearm not be within 
immediate, easy, or ready access. 
Finally, in 1995, the legislature significantly altered the 
statute, but still retained the relevant language: 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1)Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in 
Subsections (2) and (3) : 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous 
weapon which is not a firearm on his person or one 
that is readily accessible for immediate use which 
is not securely encased, as defined in this part, 
in a place other than his residence, property, or 
business under his control is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm 
permit who carries a concealed dangerous weapon 
which is a firearm and that contains no ammunition 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the 
firearm contains ammunition the person is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off 
shotgun or a sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the 
commission of a crime of violence as defined in Section 
76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the 
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person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a 
person engaged in the lawful taking of protected or 
unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23 from carrying 
a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel 
length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of 
wildlife does not occur: 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in 
violation of that municipality's ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in 
Section 41-6-1. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added) . The statute 
was expanded and a provision regarding hunting was added, but the 
language defining the offense remains the same. The legislature 
also defined "concealed dangerous weapon" to mean xxa dangerous 
weapon that is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the 
public would not be aware of its presence and is readily available 
for immediate use." Id. § 76-10-501(2) (a). This definition is new 
to the statute, and it echoes Williams's definition of carried as 
meaning within immediate, easy, or ready access. 
To conclude, the relevant language defining the offense of 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon has remained unchanged since 
State v. Williams was decided in 1981. There have been additions 
which are not relevant to this case, and some that adopted the 
concepts of Williams. Since the relevant language of § 76-10-504 
has not been changed, Williams is still precedent to interpret the 
statute. 
B. The Utah Legislature Incorporated Williams into the Statute. 
Furthermore, the Utah Legislature incorporated Williams into 
§ 76-10-504. As has been discussed, the language of that section 
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and the definition section that accompanies it, echo the holding of 
Williams. The present statute defines a "concealed dangerous 
weapon'7 as one that is "covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner 
that the public would not be aware of its presence and is readily 
available for immediate use." Id. § 76-10-501 (2) (a) . This 
language is close to the holding in Williams that a weapon is 
carried when it is "within . . . immediate, easy or ready access. 
. ." Williams, 636 P.2d at 1094. 
In addition, the legislature also defined "readily accessible 
for public use" as a "weapon [that] is carried on the person or 
within such close proximity and in such a manner that it can be 
retrieved and used as readily as if carried on the person." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-501 (2) {I) (Supp. 1995). Again, the language 
reflects Williams. It also agrees with the purpose of the statute 
as explained by the Utah Supreme Court: "Clearly, the purpose of 
concealed weapons statutes is to protect the public by preventing 
an individual from having on hand a weapon of which the public is 
unaware and which the individual might use should he be so 
inclined." Williams, 636 P. 2d at 1094. 
In short, Williams is still relevant as a guide to what § 76-
10-504 means. The relevant language, as has been seen, has 
changed little since 1981. Furthermore, the holding of Williams 
has been codified into the statute. There is no justification for 
abandoning the clear guidelines established by the Utah Supreme 
Court simply because the present statute contains some additional, 
and irrelevant, language. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is not about the adequacy of the facts. It is about 
the correctness of the trial judge's interpretation of the relevant 
law. The trial judge's ruling that § 76-10-504 requires that a 
concealed weapon be moved in a vehicle in order to be "carried" 
defies the language of the statute, and the interpretation given by 
the Utah Supreme Court. The trial judge's interpretation was 
wrong, and the verdict should be set aside, and the case retried. 
Furthermore, State v. Williams must be followed as precedent 
interpreting § 76-10-504. In the first place, the relevant 
language of the statute has not changed since the case was decided. 
Secondly, the legislature codified Williams by adding language that 
is similar to the holding. Fullmer's contention that Williams is 
no longer a valid guide to the meaning of the statute is in error. 
For these reasons, in addition to the reasons set forth in 
Appellant's Brief, the verdict of the trial judge should be set 
aside, and the case retried. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of May, 1996. 
"ELLIOT R. LAURENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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